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Abstract
In a Shared Mobility on Demand Service (SMoDS), dynamic pricing plays an important role
in the form of an incentive for empowered passengers to decide on the ride offer. Strategies for
determining the dynamic tariffs should be suitably designed so that the incurred demand and
supply within the SMoDS platform are balanced and therefore economic efficiency is further
achieved. In this manuscript, we formulate a discrete time Markov Decision Process (MDP)
to determine the probability of acceptance of each empowered passenger that is desired by the
SMoDS platform. The proposed MDP formulation is a versatile framework which is shown to
explicitly accommodate passenger behavior and realize the desired system objective. Estimated
Waiting Time (EWT) is utilized as a suitable metric to measure the balance between demand
and supply, with the goal of regulating EWT around a target value. We propose the use of
a Dynamic Programming algorithm to derive the optimal policy that achieves the regulation.
Computational experiments are conducted to demonstrate effective regulation of EWT, through
various scenarios.
Index Terms: Shared Mobility on Demand, Dynamic Pricing, Estimated Waiting Time, Markov
Decision Process, Dynamic Programming, Lookahead Search, Smart Cities.
1 Introduction
Shared Mobility on Demand Service (SMoDS) has transformed urban mobility and introduced a
continuum of solutions between the traditionally binary modes of private individual vehicles and
public mass transit, leading to a range of services with different degrees of cost, flexibility, and
carbon footprint. This manuscript pertains to an SMoDS solution that consists of customized
dynamic routing and dynamic pricing. We build on our earlier works in [1, 6, 7] and propose a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation and a Dynamic Programming (DP) algorithm towards
dynamic pricing for the SMoDS platform.
Dynamic pricing has achieved remarkable successes in emerging ride sharing platforms such
as Uber, Lyft, and Didi Chuxing, where passengers are empowered to have the option to decide
∗Corresponding author. Email: guany@mit.edu.
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whether to accept or decline the ride offers. Dynamic tariffs provide the incentive signals for the
empowered passengers; they directly affect the probability with which the passengers are likely to
accept the SMoDS ride offers. Dynamic pricing therefore helps balance the demand and supply
within the SMoDS platform through leveraging the probability of acceptance of the empowered
passengers, and hence further achieve better economic efficiency. The balance could be measured
via several Key Performance Indicators, one of which is the Estimated Waiting Time (EWT). EWT
corresponds to the average time that an upcoming passenger will wait until being picked up [5].
A large EWT(t) indicates that demand exceeds supply at time t and vice versa. Our focus in
this manuscript is on the regulation of EWT(t) around a target value EWT∗, by designing the
probability of acceptance for each empowered passenger that is desired by the SMoDS platform,
through the proposed MDP formulation and DP algorithm.
We assemble two integral components, an MDP formulation that serves as the underlying
framework to determine the desired probability of acceptance p∗ for each empowered passenger,
and a DP algorithm to derive the optimal policy of the MDP for a specific scenario with an offline
setup. The two components will help integrate human behavior into the SMoDS framework in an
efficient manner. By combining p∗ determined via the methodology proposed in this manuscript
with the passenger behavioral model developed in [6], the dynamic tariff that nudges the passenger
towards p∗ and hence enhances the balance between demand and supply can be designed for the
SMoDS platform. We demonstrate using computational experiments that EWT(t) can be effectively
regulated around EWT∗ for various EWT∗ values and for a time-varying EWT∗ as well. The
extension of the DP algorithm to online scenarios is also discussed.
Dynamic pricing for the SMoDS has been quite a popular research topic during recently years
[2, 8–12]. [2] develops a queueing-theoretic economic model for dynamic pricing and proves that it
is more robust than static pricing. [9] develops a near optimal control for ride hailing platforms
via mirror backpressure that maximizes payoff and derives the regret bound. [12] proposes the
spatio-temporal pricing mechanism that has prices be smooth in space and time therefore drivers
will not decline the dispatched rides to seek ones with higher returns nearby. The main distinction
between these earlier publications and our contributions here in this manuscript is the explicit
accommodation of behavioral modeling for the empowered passengers in the SMoDS design through
capturing their probability of acceptance of the service. In contrast to these earlier studies which
require various conditions including discretization of locations and stationary states, our proposed
problem formulation requires minimal assumptions and can be readily extended to a broad range
of scenarios with varying demand patterns and operational objectives.
2 Preliminaries: Dynamic Routing and Dynamic Pricing
The SMoDS solution we are developing consists of dynamic routing and dynamic pricing, which
delivers a customized dynamic route and dynamic tariff to each passenger [1, 6, 7]. The overall
schematic is illustrated in Fig. 1, with three building blocks functioning in the following manner.
When receiving a new ride request, the first block derives an optimized dynamic route that is to be
offered to the passenger. The second and third blocks ensure dynamic pricing that accommodates
the possibility that the empowered passenger may either accept or reject the ride offer and still
generates an overall performance desired by the SMoDS platform. Of these, the second concerns
a passenger behavioral model that derives the actual probability of acceptance for a specified dy-
namic tariff. The third and final block is the construction of a desired probability of acceptance
for the passenger that will ensure the desired performances by the SMODS platform. Using this
third block, one can then design the dynamic tariff that nudges the passenger towards the desired
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probability of acceptance by solving the inverse problem. We focus on determining desired proba-
bility of acceptance in this manuscript while only briefly introduce dynamic routing and passenger
behavioral modeling in this section, and refer the readers to [7] and [6] for mores details.
SMoDS Design
Space Window + 
AltMin
Dynamic Pricing
Desired Probability of 
Acceptance via MDP + DP/RL
Behavioral Modeling via 
Cumulative Prospect Theory
route tariff
SMoDS Ride Offer
Dynamic Routing
+
  : desired probability 
of acceptance
 : actual probability 
of acceptance
pricing
Figure 1: Overall schematic of the SMoDS design.
2.1 Dynamic Routing
An Alternating Minimization (AltMin) based optimization algorithm is developed for dynamic
routing with added spatial flexibility enabled by space window [7]. AltMin derives dynamic routes
for passengers given their requested pickup, drop-off locations, willingness to walk and other service
requirements that minimize a weighted sum of various travel time cost terms. AltMin has been
demonstrated via various computational experiments to outperform classic constrained optimiza-
tion formulations that are solved by standard solvers in terms of both computational complexity
and optimality.
In the current SMoDS design, AltMin on the one hand derives dynamic routes that are provided
in the ride offer, on the other hand contributes to the MDP formulation towards dynamic pricing,
by means of the functions FDR(·), Fwait(·, ·), and FEWT(·) which we formally introduce in Section
3.
2.2 Dynamic Pricing
Dynamic pricing is divided into two phases as follows.
2.2.1 Passenger Behavioral Modeling
The first phase is passenger behavioral modeling. A passenger behavioral model is one that inputs
the specifications of the SMoDS ride offer and alternative transportation options, then outputs
the actual probability with which the passenger takes the SMoDS. According to discrete choice
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model [3], the actual probability of accepting the `th transportation option given Q ∈ Z>0 options
to choose from is given by
p` =
eU`∑Q
q=1 e
Uq
, ∀` ∈ {1, · · · , Q} (1)
Here we apply Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) in passenger behavioral modeling to capture
subjective decision making of passengers when facing risk or uncertainty. This is because the SMoDS
is exposed to uncertainty since the vehicles need to accommodate new passengers at anytime during
the route therefore the service quality is to some extent stochastic. U` denotes the utility of taking
the `th option that is subjectively perceived by the passenger, which can be computed via the
framework we developed in [6].
2.2.2 Desired Probability of Acceptance
Given the ride specifications, the passenger is empowered to take the SMoDS with certain proba-
bility. The probability of acceptance impacts the expected performances of the SMoDS platform.
With the dynamic routes derived via AltMin, dynamic pricing serves as an incentive to tune this
probability. As discussed in Section 1, the goal is to regulate EWT(t) around the target value
EWT∗ and hence to enhance the balance between demand and supply within the SMoDS plat-
form. Therefore, the probability of acceptance desired by the SMoDS platform should minimize
the average deviation of the incurred EWT(t) from EWT∗, for which we define
Rtotal = − 1
T
∫ T
0
|EWT(t)− EWT∗| dt (2)
where T > 0 denotes the evaluation horizon. The problem can thus be posed as the maximization of
the reward Rtotal in (2), the negative of the average deviation of the incurred EWT(t) from EWT
∗.
Note that how to choose an appropriate EWT∗ value is beyond the scope of this manuscript, which
requires knowledge of the demand and supply of the SMoDS platform, i.e., request pattern and
fleet portfolio, and explicitly stated objectives, e.g., weighted combination of revenue and ridership.
This is one of our future directions. We assume that EWT∗ is given unless otherwise stated.
From (1), we obtain p = f(µ) the actual probability of acceptance from each empowered
passenger as a function of the dynamic tariff µ. The desired value p∗ is to be derived via the
methodology developed in this manuscript. We then derive the dynamic tariff µ∗ that nudges the
passenger towards p∗ by simply setting p = p∗ and solving the inverse problem µ∗ = f−1(p∗).
3 A Markov Decision Process Formulation
In this section, we propose a discrete time MDP formulation for determining the optimal desired
probability of acceptance for each passenger that makes a ride request. The agent is the SMoDS
server, while the environment denotes everything else including both the fleet and passengers. The
MDP is defined using the tuple 〈S,A,P,R, γ〉 [14], which denote the state space, action space,
state transition function, reward function, and discount factor, respectively. The reward function
corresponds to the regulation of EWT(t) around the target value EWT∗. The objective is to derive
the optimal policy for the agent so that the corresponding action is the optimal desired probability
of acceptance for each new passenger. This optimal desired probability of acceptance in turn will
maximize the expected total discounted rewards. In what follows we will describe each component
of the MDP formulation in greater detail.
We first make a few comments regarding the formulation:
4
 The overall problem is hybrid in nature, with ride requests occurring hence actions taken at
k ∈ Z>0, which correspond to discrete time instances tr = k∆tr with ∆tr ∈ R>0 defined
as the time interval between any two consecutive requests. The state of the environment is
defined in continuous time as it reflects continuous quantities such as travel times.
 The notations followed are similar to those in Sutton [14] and Silver [13]. Whenever an
uppercase symbol is used to denote a random variable, the corresponding lowercase symbol
is assumed to denote a realization of that random variable. Calligraphic symbols are used to
represent the state and action spaces as well as the state transition and reward functions.
3.1 State Space S
We denote St ∈ S as the state of the environment at time t ∈ R≥0, which corresponds to both the
fleet and passengers as well as any unprocessed ride request. Denote mt, nt ∈ Z≥0 as the numbers
of active vehicles and passengers at t within the SMoDS platform, respectively. Then
St =
[{
Svit
}
i∈[mt],
{
S
pj
t
}
j∈[nt],Ωt
]
(3)
where Svit and S
pj
t denote the state of vehicle vi and passenger pj , respectively. [X] , {1, 2, · · · , X},
∀X ∈ Z≥0. Ωt denotes the specifications of the ride request received by the agent at t with
distribution fΩt(ωt) which is assumed to be known and independent on the other components of
the state. Ωt = ∅ if t 6= tr.
Svit and S
pj
t are defined in (4) and (5), respectively.
Svit = [L
vi
t , G
vi
t , O
vi
t ] (4)
Lvit denotes the location of vehicle vi, G
vi
t denotes a set of consecutive dynamic routing points of
the route of vi, and O
vi
t corresponds to other status indicators of vi, all at time t. Examples of O
vi
t
include the number of passengers onboard.
S
pj
t = [L
pj
t , G
pj
t , O
pj
t ] (5)
L
pj
t indicates the location of passenger pj , G
pj
t denotes the requested and negotiated pickup and
drop-off locations therefore the dynamic route of pj , and similarly O
pj
t corresponds to other status
indicators of pj , all at time t. Examples of O
pj
t include the positions of pj in the request, pickup,
and drop-off queues if the maximum position shift constraints are imposed [7].
3.2 Action Space A
We denote Atr ∈ A as the action taken by the agent at tr. The action space of Atr = atr is given
by
atr ∈
[
atr , atr
]
, 0 < atr < atr < 1 (6)
where atr and atr denote the lower and upper bounds of atr respectively, both of which are functions
of the ride specifications of the SMoDS and the alternative transportation options. Since atr
corresponds to the desired probability of acceptance and the dynamic tariff in turn is affected by
atr which should be charged within a reasonable range, we choose tighter bounds as in (6). The
optimal action that maximizes the expected total discounted rewards is stated in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. ∀tr, we have the optimal action
a∗tr ∈
{
atr , atr
}
(7)
5
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Once the action is taken by the agent and delivered to the passenger, the passenger responds
with the decision on the ride offer. We denote Dtr as the passenger decision at tr, where dtr = 1
represents acceptance while dtr = 0 represents rejection. Dtr obeys the Bernoulli distribution as
Dtr ∼ B(1, atr) (8)
3.3 State Transition Function P
In this subsection, we derive the state transition function Pzxy from state x to state y under action
z. If no action z is taken, the superscript is omitted. Three different scenarios are presented,
where the first is due to continuous time dynamics while the others are due to events occurred at
discrete instances. For the latter, recall that tr denotes the time instance when a new ride request
is received, and we define t−r and t+r as time instances right before and after the passenger responds
to the agent action with a decision. The three scenarios to evaluate the state transition are detailed
as follows.
3.3.1 State Transition due to Internal Dynamics
When there is no new ride request received nor existing request processed, the transition is purely
due to the internal dynamics of the environment, i.e., movements of vehicles and passengers follow-
ing the routes, and any incurred status changes. This type of state transition is deterministic and
described as
Pstst+τ =
{
1, if st+τ = FID(st, τ)
0, otherwise
(9)
(9) is valid when no request is received or processed within [t, t + τ ],∀t, τ ≥ 0. FID(·, ·) captures
the internal dynamics.
3.3.2 State Transition due to Receiving a New Request
When there is a new request ωtr received at tr, the state transition immediately after is given by
Ps
t−r
str =
{
f(ωtr), if str = [st−r , ωtr ]
0, otherwise
(10)
f(ωtr) denotes the distribution of Ωtr where the subscript Ωtr is omitted for ease of notation. str−
and str+ denote the states right before and after the server processes the request received at tr and
the passenger decides on the ride offer, respectively.
3.3.3 State Transition due to Processing an Existing Request
When the agent takes an action to process the request and the passenger responds with the decision
on the offer, a state transition occurs by updating the status of the vehicles and passengers according
to the decision and eliminating the corresponding request if rejected. That is, the state transition
immediately after a request-processing is given by
Patrstr st+r =

atr , if st+r = FDR(str)
1− atr , if st+r = st−r
0, otherwise
(11)
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(11) states that the passenger accepts the SMoDS ride offer with the probability of atr and as a
result the state str transits to st+r = FDR(str). FDR(·) denotes the dynamic routing algorithm,
which updates the routes and hence the state transits due to accommodating the new passenger,
and is a function of str . The passenger may also decline the offer with the probability of (1− atr),
in which case, st+r = st−r .
The three scenarios discussed above have three distinct effects on the state transition. That
is, either the states evolve only due to the internal dynamics FID(·, ·), due to the receiving of a
new request, or due to the processing of an existing request. We now combine (9) through (11)
and describe the complete state transition over the interval [k∆tr, (k + 1)∆tr], which includes one
processing of an existing request at k∆tr and one receiving of a new request at (k+1)∆tr as follows:
Paksksk+1 =

akf(ωk+1), if sk+1 = [FID(FDR(sk),∆tr), ωk+1]
(1− ak)f(ωk+1), if sk+1 = [FID(sk− ,∆tr), ωk+1]
0, otherwise
(12)
The three scenarios and the overall discrete time state transition from sk to sk+1 are illustrated in
Fig. 2.
internal dynamics - Equation (9)
- Equation (12)
receive 
Equation (10)
take to process 
Equation (11)
Figure 2: Illustration of state transition.
Theorem 3.2. The discrete time states Str defined in (3) through (5) with the transition function
derived in (12) are Markov.
The proof is provided in Appendix.
3.4 Reward Function R
In the following Ryx denotes the reward function at state x following an action y, and EX denotes
the expectation of a random variable X. The total reward defined in (2) is examined over one
interval [t+r , (tr + ∆tr)
−], i.e., immediately after the agent takes the action at tr and right before
the next action is about to take place at (tr + ∆tr). This is given by
Ratrstr = −EDtr
[
1
∆tr
∫ (tr+∆tr)−
t+r
|EWT(τ)− EWT∗| dτ
]
(13)
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It is clear from (13) that the quantity on the right-hand side represents the immediate impact of
action atr on the regulation of EWT(t) around EWT
∗, before the next action.
In order to compute this reward function, we note that EWT(t) is a function of the state st
and is of the form
EWT(t) = EΩt [Fwait(st, ωt)] = FEWT(st) (14)
where Fwait(·, ·) denotes the waiting time derived via the dynamic routing algorithm as in [7] for a
given st and ωt.
3.5 Discount Factor γ
The discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1]. Typically γ < 1, while if the episode is guaranteed to terminate, we
could let γ = 1.
3.6 Value Function
With the discrete time MDP formulation elaborated in Sections 3.1 through 3.5, we rewrite the
objective function in (2) using the reward function in (13) as the expected total discounted rewards
in the form of
Rtotal = E
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkRAk∆trSk∆tr
]
(15)
where we let A0 = ∅ for ease of notation. The optimal policy pi∗(·) that maximizes (15) can now be
derived. Using a value based approach, the optimal value function of any state Str = str is defined
as
v∗(str) = max
pi(·)
E
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkRpi(str+k∆tr )str+k∆tr
∣∣∣∣∣ str
]
(16)
where the expectation is taken over the upcoming requests and the decisions (including Dtr) from
the passengers in response to the corresponding actions. Using Bellman Optimality Equation, we
rewrite (16) as
v∗(str) = maxatr
{
Ratrstr + γE
[
v∗(str+∆tr)
∣∣∣ str]} (17)
where the expectation is taken over Dtr and Ωtr+∆tr . Using (17), the optimal policy can be
described as
pi∗(str) = arg maxatr
{
Ratrstr + γE
[
v∗(str+∆tr)
∣∣∣ str]} (18)
When the numbers of active vehicles and passengers are large, and considering that the state
space is continuous, deriving pi∗(·) through v∗(·) exactly may be computationally impractical. Al-
ternatively, one could apply function approximation [4] to derive a parametrized suboptimal policy
as
p˜i∗(str ; fv) = arg max
a˜tr
{
Ra˜trstr + γE
[
v˜∗(str+∆tr ; fv)
∣∣∣ str]} (19)
where v˜∗(·; fv) is an approximation of v∗(·) parametrized by the feature vector fv, whose dimension
is much smaller than that of the state and therefore results in more efficient computation in a
broad range of applications. Examples of fv in this context could include occupancy rate of the
fleet, number of passengers waiting in the pickup queue, etc. We do not address the details of such
function approximations in this manuscript, and is relegated to future work.
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With these, the MDP formulation 〈S,A,P,R, γ〉 is detailed in Equations (3) through (14) and
we will elaborate the Dynamic Programming algorithm based on (18) that solves a special offline
case of the MDP in Section 4.
4 Dynamic Programming for Determining pi∗(·)
Through out the rest of the manuscript, we focus on a special case of the MDP which adopts
an offline setup. A DP algorithm that solves this MDP is developed and outlined in this sec-
tion. The offline case demonstrates a proof of concept that EWT(t) could be effectively regulated
around EWT∗ through leveraging the probability of acceptance of empowered passengers. The DP
algorithm is readily extended for the general online case as well.
With the offline setup, it is assumed that all ride requests are deterministic and known to the
SMoDS server a priori. These requests are processed sequentially, meaning that the ride offers are
distributed to the passengers sequentially. The action for the current passenger takes into account
future ones and the action for the upcoming passenger may adapt according to the decisions from
previous ones. This reduces the cardinality of the state space from continuum to a finite one. In
addition, according to Theorem 3.1, the space of each Atr is finite and has a cardinality of 2. These
enable the development of the value based DP algorithm that derives pi∗(·) exactly to be feasible.
Since the setup is offline, the episodes are guaranteed to terminate and therefore we set γ = 1.
  
    
  
  
   
  
 
  
   
  
     
 
  
   
  
    
  
     
    
   
    
   
   
   
  
        
  
  
   
  
                         
   termination      
passenger 
index
   initialization 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
Figure 3: Illustration of the DP algorithm to derive pi∗(·).
We now set up the DP algorithm as illustrated in Fig. 3. Each vertex in the directed and
rooted tree structure shown in the figure represents a possible state where the agent takes an
9
action, and has in turn two children depending on the decision made by the passenger in response.
An acceptance of the ride offer by the passenger corresponds to the top branch and a rejection to
the bottom, with the action itself indicated in each vertex. The action at the root is denoted as
null as no action is taken therein, and no action is indicated at the terminal vertices, represented
by black squares. Each edge represents the transition after the decision of the previous passenger
until a new request is received and a subsequent action is to be taken, and is associated with the
realization of the reward. The height of the tree is H = N + 1 and each path with length H
represents a complete episode as a result of consecutive actions of the agent and decisions from
each passenger. d[k] , [d1, · · · , dk],∀k ∈ [N ] represents the decisions of the first k passengers. We
have d[k] in the superscripts explicitly since the decisions of previous passengers determine which
vertex and edge that the DP algorithm traverses. Moreover, we let ωN+1 = ∅ for ease of notation.
The algorithm consists of two steps. The first step is to conduct dynamic routing to process ride
requests consecutively which essentially traverses the tree from the root to all leaves, therefore to
derive the reward using functions FID(·, ·), FDR(·), FEWT(·) and (13) on each edge. The second step
is to conduct backward recursion from the leaves to the root, therefore to derive the optimal value
function at each state and the corresponding optimal action at each vertex, via Bellman Optimality
Equation delineated in (18). The details of the exact DP algorithm are outlined in Algorithm 1.
Similar idea can be exploited to develop a heuristic DP algorithm that improves computational
efficiency at the cost of optimality, which is summarized in Algorithm 2. Instead of conducting
forward search till the end of the episode, i.e., number of lookahead steps being N , Algorithm 2
conducts forward search with steps N˜ ≤ N , which serves as a hyper parameter to tune the trade-off
between efficiency and optimality. For example, to derive a
d[k−1]
k , Algorithm 2 essentially carries
out E-DP(N˜) on the sub tree rooted at vertex a
d[k−1]
k with a height of N˜ , instead of traversing the
entire tree in Fig. 3.
5 A Numerical Case Study
In this section, we present a numerical evaluation of the MDP formulated in Section 3 solved via
Algorithms 1 and 2 using a specific case study. Extensions to a general online setup are discussed
at the end of this section.
5.1 Problem Setup
We consider an SMoDS which consists of a single vehicle of capacity 6. 12 ride requests are assumed
to be generated, with each request corresponding to a single passenger, and are to be served using
this vehicle. The origins and destinations are generated uniformly in a square of one by one mile.
The first 4 requests are scheduled at time t = 0 and these passengers are assumed to accept the
ride offers, which initialize the simulation episode. The following N = 8 requests are scheduled one
by one and arrive 4 minutes apart over an interval of 28 minutes. Dynamic routing is conducted
using the AltMin algorithm developed in [7]. All numerical values assumed are synthetic, and do
not correspond to any actual travel data.
The first set of parameters we need to choose are the bounds in (6). Suppose that the alternative
to the SMoDS is an exclusive non-ride sharing service, where the waiting time is set as 23EWT
∗, and
the riding time is the direct travel time from the origin to the destination. We empirically choose
atr = 0.5 and atr = 0.9 if the total travel time using the SMoDS does not exceed 1.5 times that
with the alternative. Otherwise, we choose atr = 0.2 and atr = 0.6. We note that the total travel
time is the sum of the waiting time and riding time. In order to compute the reward, EWT(t) is
10
Algorithm 1: Exact-DP Algorithm - E-DP(N)
1 Initialize the route via AltMin and derive s∅
0+
2 Initialize s∅1 ← [FID(s0+ ,∆tr), ω1], d[0] ← ∅
3 Initialize v∗
(
s
d[k−1]
k
)
← 0,∀k ∈ [N + 1], d[k−1]
4 for k = 1 : N do // step 1: traverse
5 for d[k−1] do
6 for dk = 0 : 1 do
7 d[k] ←
[
d[k−1], dk
]
8 if dk = 0 then
9 s
d[k]
k+
← sd[k−1]
k−
10 else
11 s
d[k]
k+
← FDR
(
s
d[k−1]
k
)
12 end
13 r
d[k]
k ← −
∫ 1−
0+
∣∣∣FEWT(sd[k]k+τ)− EWT∗∣∣∣ dτ
14 s
d[k]
(k+1)−
← FID
(
s
d[k]
k+
,∆tr
)
15 s
d[k]
k+1 ←
[
s
d[k]
(k+1)−
, ωk+1
]
16 end
17 end
18 end
19 for k = N : −1 : 1 do // step 2: backup
20 for d[k−1] do
21 if r
[
d[k−1],1
]
k + v
∗
(
s
[d[k−1],1]
k+1
)
≥ r
[
d[k−1],0
]
k + v
∗
(
s
[d[k−1],0]
k+1
)
then
22 a
d[k−1]
k ← ak
23 else
24 a
d[k−1]
k ← ak
25 end
26 v∗
(
s
d[k−1]
k
)
←
a
d[k−1]
k
[
r
[
d[k−1],1
]
k + v
∗
(
s
[d[k−1],1]
k+1
)]
+
(
1− ad[k−1]k
)[
r
[
d[k−1],0
]
k + v
∗
(
s
[d[k−1],0]
k+1
)]
27 end
28 end
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Algorithm 2: Heuristic-DP Algorithm - H-DP(N˜)
1 for p = 1 : N − N˜ + 1 do
2 for d[p−1] do
3 s∅1 ← s
d[p−1]
p
4 if 1 ≤ p < N − N˜ + 1 then
5 execute lines 3-28 in Algorithm 1 and derive a
d[p−1]
p
6 else
7 execute lines 3-28 in Algorithm 1 and derive a
d[q−1]
q , ∀N − N˜ + 1 ≤ q ≤ N
8 end
9 end
10 end
needed, which is determined by FEWT(·) as in (14). We approximate this function and compute
EWT(t) as the average of the waiting time for four passengers whose pickup locations are at the
four corners of the square where all requests are assumed to originate. As has been discussed in
Section 3.2 and 3.4, accurate derivations of atr , atr and EWT(t) require accurate knowledge of the
alternative transportation options, passenger behavioral model and distribution of requests, which
are beyond the scope of this manuscript. Here in this section, we adopt approximations that are
sufficiently reasonable to illustrate the central idea of regulating EWT(t) via pi∗(·) by leveraging
passenger empowerment.
5.2 Results of Computational Experiments
With the problem setup described above in Section 5.1, we apply the Exact-DP algorithm outlined
in Algorithm 1 and derive pi∗(·) under various EWT∗ values. The results are summarized in Fig.
4. The subplots in the top row correspond to EWT∗ = 4, 5, and 6 minutes, respectively, indicated
by the black dashed lines, and show how the regulation curves (marked in blue), which denote
E[EWT(t)] under the optimal policy pi∗(·) derived using E-DP(N), vary with t. For comparison,
baseline curves (marked in orange) are also plotted, which denote EWT(t) that is obtained with
the assumption that each ride offer is accepted and every passenger gets on board, which is a
deterministic computation. That is, none of the passengers is empowered in this case. It is easy to
see that the orange curve illustrates the EWT(t) that corresponds to the top path shown in Fig.
3, while the blue one corresponds to the expectation of all of the paths shown in this figure. It is
therefore not surprising that the baseline curve is identical in the three subplots since it does not
depend on EWT∗. The subplots in the bottom row of Fig. 3 show the acceptance rate under pi∗(·)
for each passenger and the mean across all passengers for the same case of EWT∗ values as in the
top row.
The plots in Fig. 4 clearly demonstrate that by using the optimal policy pi∗(·) derived via
E-DP(N), we can effectively regulate EWT(t) around EWT∗. The best choice of EWT∗, however,
is not addressed in this manuscript and beyond its scope. The second observation from Fig. 4
is that the expectation of the desired probability of acceptance of the passengers increases with
EWT∗. This could be due to the fact that EWT(t) is a metric of the balance between demand and
supply within the SMoDS platform. That is, a higher EWT(t) implies that demand exceeds supply
and therefore, the agent desires to accommodate more passengers on board and hence the desired
probability of acceptance increases.
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It should be noted that the focus here has been to design a specific SMoDS-centric variable,
which is the optimal desired probability of acceptance, in the form of an optimal policy of the
MDP, which has been carried out under the assumption that the actual probability of acceptance
by the empowered passenger will equal this optimal action. To ensure that this assumption is
valid, a suitable dynamic tariff needs to be designed; with an increasing EWT(t), to maintain the
corresponding higher acceptance rate, this dynamic tariff should perhaps be suitably decreased.
Therefore, the overall impacts of increased EWT∗ on the total revenue depend on two competing
contributions, one is increased ridership and the other is decreased revenue per ride. Hence EWT∗
should be suitably determined to tune this trade-off in order to achieve desired performances of the
SMoDS platform. These points are not discussed in detail in this manuscript, and the readers are
referred to [6].
average deviation 
[min] 2.78
1.17
1.83
0.70
1.30
0.75
Figure 4: Regulation of EWT(t) around EWT∗ and the incurred expected acceptance rates of each
passenger for different EWT∗ values.
We also evaluated E-DP(N) with a time-varying EWT∗, and the results are shown in Fig. 5.
That is, EWT∗ = 4min for the first 20 minutes and switched to 6min at t = 20. It can be seen that
E-DP(N) helps achieve a tight regulation in this case as well. These results support our argument
above that EWT∗ could be actively tuned to adapt to the actual conditions of the system during
practical operations.
We now proceed to the evaluation of H-DP(N˜), which is heuristic, and the number of lookahead
steps extends up to N˜ ≤ N rather than all the way toN . The resulting performance of the algorithm
for the case where EWT∗ = 5 minutes is illustrated in Fig. 6, where N˜ is varied from 01 to 8.
This performance is quantified in the form of the average deviation of EWT(t) from EWT∗, i.e.,
the negative of the average rewards defined in (13). Noting that the performance of H-DP(1) is
fairly close to that with H-DP(8)/E-DP(8) in Fig. 6. It is clear that H-DP(N˜) is a useful tool for
application in general cases and can lead to a close-to-optimal solution with computational ease.
1When N˜ = 0, actions are determined by directly comparing FEWT(st+r ) values, instead of using rewards and
value functions in lines 21 through 25 in Algorithm 1 for cases when N˜ > 0.
13
Figure 5: Regulation of EWT(t) around a time-varying EWT∗.
Figure 6: Average deviation of EWT(t) from EWT∗ with respect to the number of lookahead steps
N˜ .
5.3 Remarks
When the state space gets more complicated, either due to fairly large number of requests and
vehicles, or the adoption of an online setup, one can exploit function approximation that has been
briefly discussed in Section 3.6 and develop a broad range of planning and learning algorithms.
Notably, H-DP(N˜) would be quite useful in these complex cases.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this manuscript, we propose a discrete time Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation and
develop a Dynamic Programming (DP) algorithm that solves the MDP towards dynamic pricing
for Shared Mobility on Demand Service (SMoDS). The proposed MDP formulation is a versatile
framework explicitly accommodating passenger behavioral modeling that leads to desired system
level performances, and can be readily extended to a broad range of scenarios. The DP algorithm
derives the optimal policy that regulates the Estimated Waiting Time EWT(t) around a target
value EWT∗ and therefore enhances the balance between demand and supply within the SMoDS
platform, for a specific scenario of the MDP with an offline setup. Computational experiments are
carried out that demonstrate effective regulation of EWT(t) around EWT∗ as a proof of concept
that performance metrics can be improved significantly via leveraging passenger empowerment, for
various EWT∗ values and for a time-varying EWT∗. The heuristic version of the DP algorithm, H-
DP(N˜), could be exploited as the lookahead search algorithm when extended to large state spaces
or online setups. The MDP formulation and the DP algorithm, together with our previous works
on the AltMin dynamic routing algorithm in [7] and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) based
passenger behavioral modeling in [6], provide a complete solution to the SMoDS design.
Future works include developing integrated learning and planning algorithms for MDPs with a
large state space or an online setup, and investigating disciplines that guide the choice of appropriate
EWT∗ values leading to the desired combination of revenue and ridership for the SMoDS platform.
The integration of the CPT based passenger behavioral modeling with the MDP and hence directly
designing dynamic tariffs is of interest as well.
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Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Expand (17), we have
v∗(str) = max
atr∈
[
atr ,atr
]{Ratrstr + γE[v∗(str+∆tr) ∣∣∣ str]}
= max
atr∈
[
atr ,atr
]{atr{r[1]tr + γE[v∗(s[1]tr+∆tr)]}+ (1− atr){r[0]tr + γE[v∗(s[0]tr+∆tr)]}}
= max
atr∈
{
atr ,atr
}{atr{r[1]tr + γE[v∗(s[1]tr+∆tr)]}+ (1− atr){r[0]tr + γE[v∗(s[0]tr+∆tr)]}}
(20)
The first equality is equivalent to Bellman Optimality Equation and holds by definition. The
second equality holds due to expanding Ratrstr by taking the expectation of Dtr . The third equal-
ity holds because the right-hand side of the second equality is linear in atr , since the remain-
ing expectations are taken of the distribution of Ωtr+∆tr and hence r
[1]
tr , v
∗
(
s
[1]
tr+∆tr
)
, r
[0]
tr , or
v∗
(
s
[0]
tr+∆tr
)
do not depend on atr , therefore the maximum must be reached at either end point. Here
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r
[1]
tr = − 1∆tr
∫ (∆tr)−
0+
|FEWT[FID(FDR(str), τ)] − EWT∗| dτ , s[1]tr+∆tr = [FID(FDR(str),∆tr), ωtr+∆tr ],
r
[0]
tr = − 1∆tr
∫ (∆tr)−
0+
|FEWT[FID(st−r , τ)]− EWT∗| dτ , and s
[0]
tr+∆tr
= [FID(st−r ,∆tr), ωtr+∆tr ]
2. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. According to (12), we have
P
[
Sk+1 = sk+1
∣∣∣ Sk = sk, · · · , S1 = s1] = P[Sk+1 = sk+1 ∣∣∣ Sk = sk] (21)
∀k ∈ Z>0 and {s1, · · · , sk+1} ⊂ S. Obviously, (21) holds for the first and third subcases in (12).
(21) holds for the second subcase in (12) because P
[
Sk+1 = sk+1
∣∣∣ Sk = sk] = P[Sk+1 = sk+1 ∣∣∣ Sk =
sk, Sk− = sk−
]
. Hence ∀k ∈ Z>0, Sk are Markov. 
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